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Abstract 
There is much debate as to why economics students display more self-interested behavior than 
other students: whether homo economicus self-select into economics or students are instead 
“indoctrinated” by economics learning, and whether these effects impact on preferences or 
beliefs about others’ behavior. Using a classroom survey (n>500) with novel behavioral 
questions we show that, compared to students in other majors, econ students report being: (i) 
more self-interested (in particular, less compassionate or averse to advantageous inequality) 
already in the first year and the difference remains among more senior students; (ii) more likely 
to think that people will be unwilling to work if unemployment benefits increase (thus, 
assuming others are motivated primarily by self-interest), but only among senior students. 
These results suggest self-selection in preferences and indoctrination in beliefs.   
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The conventional economics paradigm, which is taught in most universities and business 
schools, models economic activity as an interaction between individual economic agents 
pursuing exclusively their self-interest. As a branch of rational choice theory, standard 
microeconomics may be described from three dominant principles, namely: methodological 
individualism, a certain view of rationality linked to mathematical optimization, and a role for 
equilibrium as a descriptive and explanatory mechanism (Ruiz-Villaverde 2019). 
 
The elaboration of neoclassical economic models starts with a representative individual, the 
homo economicus, which is assumed to be a self-interested rational optimizer. That is, s/he is 
capable of ordering preferences in a completely consistent manner and choose the best 
alternative for own consumption or production (Frank 1987; Thaler 2000; Urbina and Ruiz-
Villaverde 2019). That is why many researchers (e.g., Carter and Irons 1991; Frank et al. 1993; 
Cappelen et al. 2015; Bauman and Rose 2011; Frey and Meier 2005) have wondered if the 
study of these economic models, based on the rational pursuit of the own interest, promotes a 
type of related behavior in students. 
 
Yet, behavioral differences between students with economic training (such as economics, 
business administration, finance, and accounting; for simplicity, we label all these majors as 
“Econ”) and students of other disciplines could be attributed to two possible effects (Carter and 
Irons 1991):  
 
(1) An indoctrination effect: Econ students are shaped by economic training. Behavioral 
differences between Econ and non-Econ students are thus expected to increase during their 
studies. This stems from the fact that standard economics is based on a mathematical language 
devoid of ethical symbols, the acceptance of an economic/rational view of the world, and a set 
of simplified assumptions about how the real world works (Daboub et al. 1995). In other words, 
the argument goes that Econ students are trained to see the world through the lens of the homo 
economicus which is axiomatically assumed in economic theory. 
 
(2) A self-selection effect: a particular type of individuals, i.e., homo economicus, chooses to 
study degrees with a strong economic component. This effect entails that Econ and non-Econ 
students differ already at the start of their studies. Therefore, behavioral differences may be due 
to this selection process rather than any effect of economic education.  
 
A large literature is devoted to analyzing these effects, but many questions remain. The general 
pattern is that Econ students are more self-interested than non-Econ students, and recent 
evidence suggests that beliefs about others’ behavior explains part of such difference since 
Econ students are more likely to think others will behave in a self-interested manner (Gerlach 
2017). However, some studies suggest that Econ students are less prosocial due to an 
indoctrination effect (e.g., Frank et al. 1993; Haucap and Müller 2014; Ifcher & Zarghamee 
2018), while others find that this is due to self-selection (e.g., Meier and Frey 2004; Frey and 
Meier 2005; Mertins and Warning 2014; Frank and Schulze 2000). Finally, contrary to 
expectations, a few studies find evidence that Econ students are more willing to cooperate (e.g., 
Hu and Liu 2003; Yezer et al. 1996).  
 
In behavioral and experimental economics, self-interested behavior is typically studied within 
the framework of social (or other-regarding) preferences. It is an stylized fact that individuals 
do not always behave as selfish maximizers. Individuals often take into consideration the 
welfare of others and are willing to sacrifice part of their income to favor them. Formally, 
behavioral deviations from the prescriptions of the (narrow) self-interest paradigm have been 
modeled through different approaches, including inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; 
Bolton and Ockenfels 2000), social welfare maximization (Charness and Rabin 2002; 
Engelman and Strobel 2004), and reciprocity (Rabin 1993; Falk and Fischbacher 2006). 
 
Among these different approaches, in this study we focus on distributional preferences. 
Specifically, we build on the inequality aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) which 
allows for a key asymmetry between advantageous and disadvantageous social comparisons 
(Charness and Rabin 2002 did similarly through a generalized model incorporating social 
welfare maximizing and competitive/spiteful preferences; see, e.g., Corgnet et al. 2015). In a 
classroom survey, we use two recently created behavioral survey items to explore individual 
differences in disadvantageous and advantageous inequality aversion, that is, “envy” and 
“compassion”, respectively (Espín et al. 2018). To study how Econ and non-Econ students 
differ in their views or beliefs about other people (Frank et al. 1993; Gerlach 2017), we use 
another novel survey question inquiring whether the respondent thinks people are sheer selfish 
maximizers, i.e., homo economicus. 
 
2. Materials and Methods 
 
At the beginning of 2010, we conducted a classroom survey among 600 students from a total of 
19 different Econ (economics [n=137] and business administration [n=67]) and non-Econ 
majors (most populated: medicine [n=89], civil engineering [n=85], law [n=70], anthropology 
[n=40], and psychology [n=36]) at the University of Granada, Spain. 29% of the 204 Econ 
students and 47% of the 396 non-Econ students were first-year students.  
 
The survey intended to calibrate a set of questions to be used in a subsequent 
survey/experiment, which was conducted with a representative sample of the city of Granada in 
November 2010 (for more details of the city-representative survey/experiment, see Exadaktylos 
et al. 2013). As mentioned, here we are interested in three items included in the questionnaire.  
 
2.1. Distributional preferences 
 
The first two items measure the subjects’ self-reported aversion to unequal economic outcomes 
(Espín et al. 2018), following the framework of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). We obtained 
measures for envy and compassion, as follows: 
 
Envy: “I am not worried about how much money I have, what worries me is that there are 
people that have more money than I have.” 
 
Compassion: “I am not worried about how much money I have, what worries me is that there 
are people that have less money than I have.” 
 
Students answered using a Likert scale from 1 (“totally disagree”) to 7 (“totally agree”). 
Therefore, individuals scoring high on the envy (compassion) item report a strong aversion to 
disadvantageous (advantageous) inequality; scoring high in both items implies strong inequality 
aversion. Importantly, we proxy the weight on utility of income comparisons relative to the 
weight of personal income by using a starting sentence common to both items: “I am not 
worried about how much money I have, (…)”. This feature allows attaining the importance a 
respondent gives to disadvantageous and advantageous comparisons compared to the 
importance given to his/her own income, in the spirit of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Therefore, 
individuals who score low in these measures report being mostly concerned about their own 
income, i.e., self-interested. 
 
These measures have shown good predictive power in explaining monetarily incentivized 
distributional decisions (dictator game) in two independent large samples (Espín et al. 2018; 
Brañas-Garza et al. 2020). This suggests that the items are externally valid.   
 
2.2. Beliefs about others’ (self-interested) motivations  
 
The third item refers to the students’ beliefs about the effect of economic policy on people’s 
behavior. If unemployment benefits increase, how would people respond? We are not aware of 
previous studies using this item, labeled as “unemp benefits”. It elicits the students’ views about 
the representative individual’s primary motivation: 
 
Unemp benefits: “If unemployment benefits increase, less people will be willing to work.” 
 
Students reported their agreement with the statement using the same 1-to-7 Likert scale. A high 
score on unemp benefits indicates that the respondent believes other people are homo 
economicus, i.e., primarily motivated by their self-interest: if people are self-interested and no 
other social, moral, or psychological motives underlie their employment decisions, they will 
respond uniquely to extrinsic monetary incentives and will, consequently, reduce their 
willingness to work as unemployment benefits increase. Note that this is a textbook explanation 
of the (allegedly) negative effect of unemployment benefits on employment in most 
introductory and intermediate microeconomics and macroeconomics courses, also in the 
University of Granada. However, more advanced research demonstrates that the answer to this 
question is much more complex, as many factors need to be considered, including human 
capital accumulation, long-term effects and discounting, reservation wage adjustments, 
reference-dependent preferences, and psychological wellbeing (Clark 2003; Howell and 
Azizoglu 2011; Schmieder and Von Wachter 2016; DellaVigna et al. 2017, 2020; Marinescu 
and Skandalis 2019). 
 
3. Results and Discussion 
 
Due to the categorical nature of the scales, we transform them into binary variables for the 
analyses: individuals are labeled as scoring “high” in an item if their answer is 4 or more (the 
results are qualitatively similar if we consider the complete scales; available upon request). We 
will say that there is a self-selection effect if Econ and non-Econ students differ in the first 
year. We will infer a training or indoctrination effect if the two groups differ more after the first 
year than in the first year. 
 
Figure 1 displays the mean proportion of high scorers in each measure broken down into non-
Econ (blue bars) and Econ majors (red bars). The left panel refers to “junior”, first-year 
students while the right panel refers to students in second year or higher, i.e., “senior” students. 
Note that we cannot disaggregate the latter group into different courses because the sample size 
is limited and there are 3-, 4-, and 5-year majors included, with students in all years from 2nd to 
5th in the sample (this also means that any indoctrination effect observed might represent a 
lower bound of the true effect). 
 
 
Figure 1. Mean proportion of high scorers in each of the three measures for non-Econ (in blue) and 
Econ students (in red). Left panel refers to first-year students while right panel refers to senior students 
(2nd year or higher). P-values are obtained from Wald tests on the interaction coefficients in the 
regressions with controls in Table 1, that is, columns 4, 8, and 12, for envy, compassion, and unemp 
benefits, respectively. Error bars represent robust standard errors. 
 
Table 1 shows the results of a series of probit regressions where the dependent variable is 
whether the student scores high on a particular item. Explanatory variables are whether the 
individual is an Econ student (vs. non-Econ) and whether s/he is a senior student (vs. first 
year). In each model, we also include the interaction between Econ and senior to test if the 
differences between Econ and non-Econ students are moderated by seniority. All models are 
repeated with gender (male), age, and household income as control variables. These are key 
controls because all have been found to correlate with responses to the distributional 
preferences items (Espín et al. 2018, Brañas-Garza et al. 2020). Also, controlling for age is 
essential to avoid confounding the effect of seniority (i.e., exposure to economics training) with 
that of age (Bauman and Rose 2011). Significance levels in Figure 1 are obtained from Wald 
tests on the interaction coefficients in the models with controls. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Figure 1 shows that Econ and non-Econ do not differ in their self-reported level of envy, neither 
among junior nor among senior students (both p>0.3; column 4 in Table 1). However, Econ are 
less likely to score high on compassion than non-Econ, both among junior and senior students 
(p=0.037 and p=0.016, resp.; column 8). Thus, we find evidence of self-selection for 
compassion, but not envy: less compassionate students are more likely to start Econ studies. 
The interaction between Econ and senior is non-significant for either envy or compassion (both 
p>0.40), indicating that indoctrination does not play a role for distributional preferences and, 
consequently, for self-interest.  
 
Regarding unemp benefits, we observe a different pattern. Econ and non-Econ students do not 
differ in the first year (p=0.744) but they strongly differ after the first year: compared to senior 
non-Econ, senior Econ students are more likely to agree that increasing unemployment benefits 
discourages people to work (p<0.001; column 12). The interaction between Econ and senior is 
indeed significant (p=0.040 with controls, p=0.023 without controls; columns 12 and 10, resp.), 
which suggests an indoctrination effect on beliefs. Interestingly, when controls are accounted 
for, this effect is due to the combination of a marginally significant increase, from the first year 





Our results suggest that economic training shapes the psychology of students. However, we 
find no evidence of an indoctrination effect on the students’ distributional preferences and, 
consequently, on self-interest, but only on their expectations about others: economic training 
seems to induce students to think that people are primarily driven by their self-interest. 
Consistent with our findings, Frank and Schulze (2000) and Frey and Meier (2005), among 
others, find self-selection effects on decisions where expectations about others should not 
influence behavior, whereas indoctrination effects have been typically found in more complex 
games in which strategic considerations do play a role (e.g., Frank et al. 1993; Ifcher & 
Zarghamee 2018). Interestingly, as Frank et al. (1996: 187) indicated, the argument that 
“training in economics encourages the belief that people are self-interested” seems to be not 
contended. However, to our best knowledge, this is the first study clearly showing both a self-
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Table 1. Self-selection and indoctrination effects on envy, compassion, and unemp benefits 
  
envy envy envy envy compassion compassion compassion compassion unemp ben unemp ben unemp ben unemp ben 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Econ -0.090 -0.176 -0.093 -0.230 -0.319*** -0.301 -0.375*** -0.422** 0.510*** 0.127 0.439*** 0.072    
 
(0.121) (0.211) (0.127) (0.222) (0.111) (0.190) (0.117) (0.202) (0.129) (0.208) (0.133) (0.219)    
senior 0.023 -0.014 0.026 -0.046 0.115 0.123 0.066 0.041 -0.109 -0.262* -0.003 -0.190    
 
(0.116) (0.137) (0.137) (0.168) (0.107) (0.127) (0.125) (0.154) (0.118) (0.135) (0.140) (0.165)    































-0.038** -0.034**  












-0.025 -0.065    












0.087 0.077    





(0.063) (0.064)    
constant -0.673*** -0.653*** -0.779** -0.764* 0.025 0.021 -0.224 -0.218 0.560*** 0.644*** 1.164*** 1.217*** 
 
(0.093) (0.100) (0.395) (0.396) (0.086) (0.093) (0.363) (0.364) (0.092) (0.101) (0.388) (0.392)    
chi2 0.563 0.802 6.001 6.799 8.611** 8.636** 20.825*** 20.896*** 15.617*** 21.039*** 20.582*** 24.662*** 
log-likelihood -331.255 -331.127 -288.234 -287.959 -406.653 -406.645 -351.202 -351.162 -327.848 -325.306 -281.012 -278.930    
pseudo-R2 0.001 0.001 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.029 0.029 0.025 0.033 0.034 0.042    
obs 595 595 524 524 593 593 522 522 589 589 519 519    
Notes: Probit estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables are displayed on top of the columns. Models with controls include age, gender, and income level 
(=1 if “low”, 2 if “medium-low”, 3 if “medium”, 4 if “medium-high”, 5 if “high”). Due to the potentially problematic interpretation of non-linear interaction effects (Ai and Norton 
2003), we test the interactions using linear probability models; the results are nearly identical. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
 
